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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  04-4166
WILLIAM L. CARTER, III,
               Appellant
  v.
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner
of Social Security
                                                         
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No.: 03-cv-01239
District Judge:  The Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
                                                          
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 6, 2005
                                                          
Before:  McKEE, SMITH, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 26, 2005)
                                                         
OPINION OF THE COURT
                                                          
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
William L. Carter, III, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment to the Commissioner of
Social Security, thereby affirming the denial of Carter’s application for disability
2insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.  The District Court had
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  Appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.  Our review, like that of the District Court, is limited to whether the
Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.  Plummer v. Apfel, 186
F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).  Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla.  It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).  We will affirm.
This appeal concerns Carter’s third application for disability benefits.  Carter’s
second application for benefits alleged that he was disabled as of May 15, 1995, as a
result of arthritis and the residual effects of bilateral total knee replacements.  After
Carter waived his right to a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), his
second application was denied in a decision rendered by ALJ Herring on August 10,
1999.
 Instead of seeking judicial review of the denial of his second application, Carter
filed a third application on October 5, 1999.  Like his earlier applications, Carter again
alleged disability as a result of arthritis and the residual effects of bilateral total knee
replacements, but he also recited the fact that he had been diagnosed on July 12, 1999
with diabetes mellitus.  Prior to his hearing before ALJ Sturek, Carter amended the onset
date of his disability from May 1995 to July 1999.  In a decision dated October 25, 2000,
3ALJ Sturek applied the familiar sequential analysis to Carter’s amended claim, and
concluded that Carter was not disabled under the Social Security Act.  See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520.
In determining that Carter was not disabled, ALJ Sturek found that the residual
effects of Carter’s knee replacements, his obesity and his diabetes mellitus were severe
impairments, but that they did not satisfy the criteria of any of the impairments listed in
Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations.  See 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, § 404, Appendix
1.  ALJ Sturek further found that these impairments limited Carter to performing less than
the full range of sedentary work.  Although this residual functional capacity was
incompatible with the demands of Carter’s past relevant work, ALJ Sturek relied upon the
testimony of the vocational expert and found that Carter’s limitations did not preclude
him from performing other work existing in the national economy.
Carter appealed to the District Court, arguing that ALJ Sturek erred by failing to
reopen his second application for benefits to consider the evidence regarding the recent
onset of diabetes mellitus.  Carter also alleged error because ALJ Sturek had not
incorporated into his decision ALJ Herring’s earlier more restrictive findings regarding
Carter’s residual functional capacity.  Carter contends that the earlier findings, together
with the limitations imposed by his new diagnosis of diabetes mellitus, would have
compelled the determination that he was disabled.  According to Carter, res judicata
required ALJ Sturek to incorporate ALJ Herring’s residual functional capacity findings in
4his adjudication of Carter’s third application.  In addition, Carter asserted that ALJ 
Sturek relied upon a defective hypothetical in determining his ability to perform other
work, improperly discounted the opinions of his treating physicians, and failed to apply
Social Security Rulings 00-3p and 96-7p.  
In a thorough opinion, the District Judge affirmed the denial of Carter’s third
application for benefits.  Failure to reopen the earlier application was not reversible error,
according to the District Court, because ALJ Sturek fully considered the evidence and
determined that Carter was not disabled.  The District Court rejected Carter’s contention
that res judicata required ALJ Sturek to incorporate in his adjudication of Carter’s claim
for benefits the earlier findings of ALJ Herring.  The Court pointed out that res judicata
was an affirmative defense that could not be invoked as a shield, particularly in light of
the new evidence regarding the onset of Carter’s diabetes mellitus.  In addition, the
District Court determined that ALJ Sturek adequately explained the weight he accorded to
the medical evidence of record and concluded that there was substantial evidence to
support ALJ Sturek’s decision that Carter was not disabled under the Social Security Act. 
Finally, the District Court determined that ALJ Sturek appropriately applied the Social
Security Rulings. 
After careful consideration of the briefs of the parties and the record before us, we
agree with the District Court that ALJ Sturek’s denial of Carter’s claim is supported by
substantial evidence.  The affirmative defense of res judicata did not bind ALJ Sturek
because the record contained new evidence that was unavailable to ALJ Herring, and
because the relief sought was limited to a determination that he was disabled from July 
1999, instead of May 1995 as alleged in the earlier application.  See Purter v. Heckler,
771 F.2d 682, 690 (3d Cir. 1985).   In light of the difference of four years between the
alleged onset date of disability in Carter’s second and third application, there was no
reason to reopen the earlier application.
We also conclude, contrary to Carter’s assertions, that the opinions of his treating
physicians were accorded great weight inasmuch as ALJ Sturek restricted Carter to less
than the full range of sedentary work.  We find no error by ALJ Sturek in discounting the
opinions of Dr. Cantera and Dr. Galleta that Carter was unable to work because ALJ
Sturek appropriately explained that these opinions were unsupported by objective medical
evidence.  For this reason, we agree with the District Court that the hypothetical posed to
the vocational expert was not deficient and that ALJ Sturek did not err by relying on the
vocational expert’s opinion.  
In sum, there is substantial evidence to support ALJ Sturek’s decision that Carter
was not disabled as of July 12, 1999.   We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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